| 
 | Born April 28 1906 
        Brno - Moravia Died 14th January 1978 Princeton New Jersey (Starved himself to death)
 In the early 1930's 
        Kurt Godel pulled the rug out from under the feet of philosophers, logicians 
        and mathematicians.He 
        was regarded as a brilliant mathematician and perhaps the greatest logician 
        since Aristotle. And yet he died because he became convinced that the 
        doctors who were caring for him were intent upon poisoning him. Presumably 
        if he had had the slightest doubt about that, he would have taken the 
        risk, and eaten a morsel. Instead he made the choice to reject the food. 
        And starved himself to death.
 Some further 
        biographical notes follow a brief discussion of some of Godel's ideas, 
        which have had important implications for mathematics and logic, as well 
        as for computer science.
  This statement 
        is unprovable. Kurt Godel's great achievement 
      was to translate the so-called Godel sentence into a system of formal logic, 
      using mathematical symbols.  
      In this setting it implied the theorem that every sufficiently powerful 
      edifice of logic contained a statement which was true but not provable.
 The following 
        sentence is true: This statement is unprovable.Is it true? Well, suppose it were false. Then its opposite would be 
        true, and the statement would be provable. So, it must be true.
 Is it unprovable? Yes. By its own account it is.
 The truth of the statement is provable. But the statement itself is unprovable.
 For Godel this was 
        not merely a mind game. Using the mathematical representations of that 
        reasoning, he showed, via what he called the incompleteness theorem, that 
        it was not possible to prove the consistency of a formal system within 
        the system itself.  The dream of a unitary 
        system in which all mathematical truths could be deduced from a handful 
        of axioms could not be realised. In this regard the 
        hopes of Russell, Whitehead, Frege and a host of other logicians were 
        dashed. Treasured 
        ideas that had been accepted and in daily use for more than 2,000 years, 
        since the time of Euclid, were profoundly challenged by  
        this small, slight, quiet man, 
        who with two papers managed to shake the structure of mathematics to its 
        very foundation. 
        Godel's ideas also have profound implications for computer science, as 
        well as for As well as affecting mathematics, logic, philosophy, and truth 
        itself. During the 1920's 
        shock waves had run through the science of physics, because of Heisenberg's 
        Uncertainty Principle. But mathematics was believed to be on much firmer 
        ground. In 
        1925 the most renowned mathematician of his day, David Hilbert, who was 
        extremely good at giving pep talks, referred to certain wobbly moments 
        that had been faced in the history of mathematics.  Such as:  
        The paradoxes 
          of the infenitisimals. Quantitities that are infinitely small but actually 
          exist. As Bishop Berkeley said, '...They are neither finite quantities, 
          nor quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call 
          them ghosts of departed quantities?'  Set theory. 
          Bertrand Russell referred to a set of all sets which do not contain 
          themselves. Can such a set exist? The point is, such a set neither 
          contains itself nor does it not contain itself.
  'What we have experienced 
        twice,' Hilbert said, ' Cannot happen a third time, and will never happen 
        again.' And 
        then there was Godel. The 
        first of two papers that made Godel's name was his 1929 doctoral thesis, 
        "The Completeness of the First Order Functional Calculus.' It was rather 
        reassuring, considering what followed, dealing as it did with the rules 
        of logic which had been developed up to that time and which Godel regarded 
        as still adequate for their intended purpose. The questions he asked, 
        concerning axioms and truths, could be proved under all interpretations 
        of the symbols. And although some qualms were expressed in the work, they 
        concerned entities that might masquerade as numbers, but would be essentially 
        different from them. Mathematicians hoped such things did not exist.  It was the 1931 
        paper which caused all the trouble. It was called 'On formally undecidable 
        propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems.'  Godel's belongings 
        and documents are now on display at the Institute for Advance Study thanks 
        to the tireless efforts of John W. Dawson, a mathematician from Penn State 
        University. Dawson is also co-editor of Godel's Collected Works,  
        which involved deciphering page after page of Godel's old German shorthand. 
        Among the many effects gathered from 60 boxes of possessions, is a 
        bookseller's statement, recording Godel's purchase, on the 31st July 1928, 
        of Principia Mathematica, the three volume work by Russell and 
        Whitehead. It is a most careful work, which in the English version takes 
        362 pages to prove that 1+1=2. Godel reduced the entire vast structure 
        to rubble. What's 
        more, he established that mathematics is not the omnipotentsystem that 
        Hilbert had declared it to be. Hilbert had said, '...in mathematics there 
        is no ignorabimus'.  
        What he meant 
        was: mathematicians do not say, 'We'll never know.'  Russell and Whitehead's 
        Principia Mathematica was intended to be an all-encompassing document. 
        Godel's comment in the paper was devastating. '..one might...conjecture 
        that these axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to decide any 
        mathematical question that can be formally expressed in these systems. 
         It will be shown 
        that this is not the case.' And 
        so it was that Godel provided a proposition that, contrary to all expectations, 
        could not be proven true in the sytem in which it was expressed. 
       'This statement is unprovable'. The 
        proposition is in fact unprovable. But because of that very fact 
        it is true. It is a true proposition that cannot be proven to be 
        true.
 Godel had intended 
        to become a physicist, but inspired by the lectures of Philipp Furtwangler 
        and Hans Hahn, he switched to mathematics. Hahn in particular  
        was swift to recognise Godel's potential and invited him to join the fabled 
        Vienna Circle, where he came into contact with such philosophers as Schlick 
        and Carnap and  
        and encountered the ideas of Mach and Wittgenstein. Some members of the 
        Vienna Circle also had an interest in paranormal phenomena.  Indeed Godel himself 
        was convinced that in the future it would be considered a great oddity 
        that twentieth century scientists had studied elementary particle physics 
        but had failed even to consider the possibility of elementary psychic 
        factors. Once 
        Godel's great papers were published, he received an invitation to join 
        the Institute for Advanced Study, a hothouse for genius.  Godel was also said 
        to be attractive to women; the great love of his life, and the only person 
        to get really close to him was Adele Porkert, sometimes called Adele Nimbursky 
        - perhaps Pokert was her stage name. She was a dancer, and he'd met her 
        in a Viennese nightspot. She became his wife, much to the distaste of 
        his family. Adele Godel has been described as having had a 'disfiguring' 
        birthmark on her face, the colour of port wine, but appears, in photographs 
        at least, to have been a beauty. Their relationship lasted 45 years, and 
        she was the only one who could persuade him to eat. He wasted away while 
        she was in hospital. She died three years later, in 1981, and although 
        snobbish Princeton was never particularly kind to her, she bequeathed 
        Godel's papers to the Institute for Advanced Study; she believed in him 
        and in his legacy.She 
        had accompanied him to America and back to Germany during the 1930's, 
        and then, when Godel was actually called up to serve as one of Hitler's 
        soldiers, she accompanied him back to America again.  Godel did not have 
        many close friends  
        but the economist Oskar Morgenstern and the great physicist Albert Einstein 
        spent time with him; indeed Godel and Einstein were often seen taking 
        walks together. One 
        of the stories that has been passed down about Godel's ever-active mind 
        concerns a trip that Morgenstern, Einstein and he made by car - on the 
        21st April 1948. They drove to the government offices in Trenton, the 
        capital of New Jersey, a rough town about a half an hour from Princeton. 
        Einstein chatted all the way, in order to keep his friend distracted from 
        the ordeal ahead. When it came to be his turn to be examined by a U.S. 
        official, he made sure the form stated that he was Austrian, not German. 
        That was perhaps a necessary correction but his friends were nervous about 
        further outbursts. Then the functionary expressed sympathy about the terrible 
        dictatorship which Godel had experienced first hand, and that he should 
        therefore be permitted to remain in America, where such a repressive regime 
        was impossible. Godel called out, 'On the contrary, I know how that can 
        happen, quite legally. This constitution states - ' Before he could ruin 
        all chances of gaining U.S. citizenship, Einstein and Morgenstern forcibly 
        restrained him.  Godel's reputation 
        among mathematicians, logicians and philosophers was considerable, and 
        yet it took the Institute for Advanced Study 20 years before he was awarded 
        a professorship there. He was a Platonist. He believed in numbers as 'objects. 
        And, althougn Hilbert and other mathematicians were dismayed by Godel's 
        incompleteness theorems, he himself did not believe that he had demonstrated 
        the inadequacy of the so called axiomatic method. He simply felt that 
        the demonstration of theorems was not a mechanical process, and that in 
        mathematical research an important role was played by intuition.  Other discussions 
        in which Godel engaged included his lectures at the Institute in 1938, 
        when he addressed set theory again, addressing the inevitable fact that 
        the set of all decimal numbers is larger than the set of all natural numbers 
        and that no set has a size intermediate between those two.  He also addressed 
        counterintuitive anomalies in what is called the axiom of choice: for 
        instance a sphere may be decomposed into a finite number of pieces that 
        can be separated and then reassembled, using only rigid systems, to form 
        a new sphere which woul have twice the volume of the first.  By 1938 Godel had 
        given up set theory and turned to philosophy and even relativity theory. 
        In 1949 he showed that it was compatible with Einstein's equation to consider 
         universes in which 
        time travel was possible. Going further in his discussions with Einstein, 
        he also came to the conclusion that both the lapse of time and the existence 
        of change in nature were unreal and illusory. For his this was unequivocal 
        proof of the views of Parmenides and Kant. Change, he said, is an 'appearance 
        due to our special mode of perception'. He published his work on general 
        relativity in a 1949 paper, in which he tells of a 'rotating universe', 
        a cosmic pool of whirling matter. And that swirling  
        material gives rise to space-time trajectories that loop back upon themselves. 
        So, time is not made up of a linear sequence of events, but bends around 
        the cosmos in a bending line. He wrote, 'By making a round trip on a rocket 
        ship in a sufficiently wide curve, it is possible to travel into any region 
        of the past, present, and future, and back again.'  The ideas put forward 
        by Godel in his incompleteness paper are relevant to what is known as 
        recursive function theory - the study of what can and cannot be done by 
        an ideal computer. Firstly it has been discovered that computers are subject 
        to an insoluble 'halting' problem. This involves the difficulty of deciding 
        - for an arbitrary computer with an arbitrary input - whether that computer 
        will at any time or eventuallt 'halt' and produce and output, rather thanremaion 
        stuck in an unending. Another problem is rather topical since it includes 
        the question of viruses: No programme that does not alter a computer's 
        operating system can detect all programmes that do. Kurt 
        godel's ideas and writings will be studied and pondered over for many 
        years to come. A final question that he tackled and is yet to obtain a 
        wider audience has to do his approach to St. Anselm's proof for the existence 
        of God.  (St. Anselm's 
        proof begins with the idea that God is "that than which nothing greater 
        can be conceived". This can be reformulated : "the thought object than 
        which no thought object can be thought to be greater". (1) God is 
        the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater 
        Now suppose that
 (2) God is only in the intellect (i.e. God is thought of, but does not 
        exist) But certainly
 (3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be 
        thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in the intellect 
        And it cannot be doubted that
 (4) God can 
        be thought to exist in reality Therefore,
 (5) Some thought object can be thought to be greater than the thought 
        object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater which 
        is a contradiction, whence we have to abandon our supposition that God 
        is only in the intellect, so he has to exist in reality, too. Implied 
        from [1,2,3,4]) Godel's 
        ontological argument for the existence of God appears in his Collected 
        Works, which are steadily attracting more and more attention.
 
         
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