DP
In a recent theory of yours, is not causality retained, perhaps
in a new form?
Heisenberg:
We have causality in that sense - that in order to influence
something,
there must be an action from one point to the next point;
no action can happen if there is not this connection. But at this
point one gets into rather complicated details.
DP
But even so, you do have causality predicated on the idea of
separation and action, so this again comes back to a philosophical
level: what you mean by separation, and by interaction.
Heisenberg:
We must speak about 'interaction' and 'separation,' that is
quite true,
and we use the terms as we did in classical theory. But, again,
we see
limitation. Complete separation of two events may be possible
in classical theory; it is not possible in quantum theory. So we
use the terms together with the fact of their limitation.
DP
What exactly are the criteria for something to be classical?
Heisenberg:
I would say the criteria are simply that we can get along with
these concepts
(e.g. 'position,' 'velocity, ' temperature,' 'energy'), and so long
as we get along with them, then we are in the classical domain.
But when
the concepts are not sufficient, then we must say that we
have gone beyond this classical domain. Every
system in physics (forget for the moment about biological systems)
is always quantum theoretical, in the sense that we believe
that quantum theory gives the correct answers for its behaviour.
When we say that it is classical, we mean that we do get
the correct or the necessary answers by using classical concepts
(at least in that approximation in which we can describe the
system by classical concepts). So a system is classical only within
certain limits and these limits can be defined.
DP
How would you include things like irreversibility?
Heisenberg:
Thermodynamics is a field which goes beyond Newtonian mechanics,
inasmuch
as it introduces the idea of thermodynamic equilibrium, or canonical
distribution as W. Gibbs has put it. Thermodynamics leaves
classical physics and goes into the region of quantum theory, for
it speaks about situations of observation; it does not speak about
the system as it is, but about the system in a certain state of
being
observed, namely in the state of temperature equilibrium. If this
equilibrium is not obeyed, then we cannot use thermodynamics. So
the whole concept of irreversibility is bound up with the concept
of thermodynamic
equilibrium.
DP
And is this ultimately connected with the idea of a classical
limit to something? I am thinking of the measurement problem that
always seems to be associated with an irreversible process: that
we have a definite result for a quantum mechanical system where
the quantum mechanics itself doesn't seem to predict a definite
result. That is, the idea of a quantum mechanical measurement seems
to be tied up with the idea of an irreversible trend.
Heisenberg:
Yes, to some extent, because on the side of the observer we
do use
classical concepts. The idea that we do observe something already
indicates something irreversible. If we draw a pencil line on a
paper,
for instance, we have established something which cannot be undone,
so to speak. Every observation is irreversible, because we have
gained information that cannot be forgotten.
DP
To what extent is this related to the symmetry-breaking of the
quantum mechanical system where one gets classical observables?
Heisenberg:
I would not like to connect it with symmetry-breaking; that
is going a
bit far. We try to describe the observational situation by writing
down
a wave function for the object and the equipment which is in interaction
with this wave function. Just by using classical words for the
equipment, we have already made the assumption of irreversibility.
Or we make the assumption of statistical behaviour, because
the mere use of classical words for this observation on the side
of the system makes it impossible to know the total wave function
of object and equipment. But we cannot use quantum theory
for the equipment in a strict sense, because if we wrote down
the wave function for the object and the equipment, we could not
use classical words for the equipment, so we would not observe anything.
We do observe only when we use classical concepts, and just
at this point this hypothesis of disorder, of statistical behaviour,
comes
in.
DP
With regard to something like ferromagnetism, the quantum mechanical
system has given rise to a macroscopic ordering. Is it true to say
that a quantum mechanical system has actually broken its own symmetry
and given rise to a classical variable, without any talk about a
measuring apparatus, or anything exterior to the system?
Heisenberg:
Let us consider a ferromagnet as isolated from the rest of the
world for
some time, and then ask what the lowest state of the system is.
We find,
from the quantum mechanical calculations, that the lowest state
is one in which the whole system has a very large component of
magnetic momentum. If we then ask 'what do we observe when we
consider this system?' we see that it is convenient to ascribe the
classical variable 'magnetic momentum' to the system. So we can
use classical terms to describe this quantum mechanical behaviour.
But this is not really a problem of observation, only a problem
of how the lowest state of the system is defined.
PB
How does quantum mechanics deal with time flow or does it in
fact say anything at all about it?
Heisenberg:
I would have to repeat what C. von Weizsäcker said in his
papers: that
time is the precondition of quantum mechanics, because we want
to go from one experiment to another, that is from one time to another.
But this is too complicated to go into in detail. I would simply
say that the concept of time is really a precondition of quantum
theory.
PB
In the domain where quantum mechanics operates, all of the equations
are reversible with respect to time, except for one experiment I
believe. So time has more to do with macroscopic classical systems
than microscopic quantum systems.
Heisenberg:
I would say that irreversibility of time has to do with this
other system,
with those problems which I. Prigogine describes in his papers,
and is certainly extremely important for the macroscopic application
of quantum theory, and also for biology, of course.
DP
Can we talk about a new theory of yours, the non-linear theory
of elementary particles? Are you ultimately going to introduce things
like gravitation into this theory, and go over to a picture in which
space and time emerge?
Heisenberg:
Again, we have a similar situation as in ferromagnetism. We
try to solve
the quantum mechanical, or quantum theoretical equation, but we
can see that the system acquires properties which then can be described
by classical language (e.g. like speaking of a magnetic momentum,
etc.). We are hoping that such phenomena as electromagnetic
radiation and gravitation also can come out of the theory
of elementary particles, and we have reasons to believe that this
is so.
DP
The idea of symmetry is a very important part of your theory.
Heisenberg:
Let's begin more simply by speaking about quantum mechanics,
disregarding
now the difficulties of elementary particle physics. In quantum
mechanics we see that macroscopic bodies have very complicated
properties, complicated shapes and chemical behaviour and
so on. Coming down to smaller and smaller particles, we finally
come
to objects which are really very much simpler, for example the stationary
states of a hydrogen atom. We describe its properties by saying
that these states are a representation of the fundamental symmetries,
such as rotation in space. So when we describe a system
by writing down a few quantum numbers (in hydrogen atoms,
we have the principal quantum number and the angular momentum
number) this means that we know nothing except to say that
this object is a representation of symmetries. The quantum numbers
tell us which kind of symmetries we mean; the numbers themselves
say that this object has these special properties. Thus, when
we come to the smallest objects in the world, we characterize them
in quantum mechanics just by their symmetry, or as representations
of symmetries, and not by specifying properties such
as shape or size.
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